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Hidden History of Securities Damages
Allen Ferrell*
Approaches to calculating fraud on the market 10b-5 damages have evolved
substantially from the 1970s to the present. In this Essay I discuss the various approaches used over this span of time, including the rise of the event study approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated over a hundred years
ago (in his 1897 lecture The Path of the Law) that “[f]or the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and
the master of economics.”1 No better proof of Holmes’s prescience
can be found than Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel’s The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law.2 This book pursues the rational study of corporate law by applying economic principles to
its subject matter. Often clear and rigorous rational study is reflected in compelling prose. This is another point of commonality
between Holmes’ writing and the Economic Structure of

Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School; PhD.
1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
*
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Corporate Law.3 If a point can be made crisply and concisely, the
authors do so.
My point of departure in this essay will be the economic analysis of securities damages in “fraud on the market” Rule 10b–5
cases, a subject discussed in the book4 as well as Daniel Fischel’s
seminal 1982 article.5 These cases typically involve allegations
that a publicly-traded company made materially false and/or misleading public statements that were then impounded into the
price of the company’s stock (and possibly other securities of the
firm, such as debt). The statements are presumed to be impounded into the stock price because the market quickly impounds all material public information (including materially false
and/or misleading information), i.e., the market is “efficient.”
These cases typically, although not inevitably, involve shareholder purchases made when the stock price was allegedly inflated as a result of materially false or misleading positive statements by the firm. Shareholders can thereby potentially be
harmed by purchasing at “too high” a price and as a result suffer
economic losses when the market learns the truth (usually at the
moment when a “corrective disclosure” occurs revealing the information that could and should have been disclosed earlier) at some
later point in time. Measurement of this economic harm is the
goal when estimating securities damages. Section 11 cases, which
involve materially misleading and/or false statements in a company’s registration statement, operate similarly except the burden of proof lies with defendants.
The economic analysis of securities damages in practice is
largely hidden from public view. This might seem a strange statement given the substantial volume of securities class action lawsuits every year, going back decades. For instance, some 551 class
action lawsuits were filed in the last two years alone
(2020–2021).6 But virtually all these cases are decided before trial
(such as on a motion to dismiss) or settle. A mere thirty-three

3
I am reminded of a quip by Justice Scalia where he said that his goal for the Supreme Court Term was to have all his opinions combined together shorter than the longest
opinion by another (rather wordy) member of the Court.
4
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 344–45.
5
See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS LAW. 1 (1982).
6
CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2021 YEAR IN REVIEW 4
(2022), https://perma.cc/ES3C-SCCT.
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securities class action lawsuits have gone to trial since 1996.7
While there are to be sure judicial decisions that discuss securities damages (and I will discuss a few) they are few and far between, and those that do exist tend to be at a high level of generality. Actual estimates of securities damages, and the analyses
that underlie them, are for the most part contained either in expert reports submitted during the course of the litigation (either
on behalf of the plaintiffs or the defendants) or in economic analyses presented to a securities mediator. These analyses are by
and large confidential.
With this in mind, I will discuss in broad strokes how securities damage calculations have changed from the 1970s to today
and how those changes relate to the insights contained in the Economic Structure of Corporate Law and in Fischel’s 1982 article on
the topic. As I will explain, their academic work has led the way
in changing for the better the practice of estimating securities
damages. Not coincidentally, these changes were also associated
with deploying an ever-increasing financial sophistication in how
securities damages are estimated. The need for combining legal
acumen with sophisticated economic analysis in this area of law,
the type of interdisciplinary analysis exemplified by the Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, has never been greater.
II. THE WILD WEST: 1970S–1993
I will begin my history with a landmark 1976 judicial opinion:
Judge Sneed’s well-known Ninth Circuit concurring opinion in
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.8 In that opinion, Judge
Sneed explained that securities damages could be calculated
based on the difference between the actual price and a “value
line.”9 The “value line” is the price that the security would have
had but for the alleged materially false and/or misleading statements, i.e. the alleged securities fraud.10 The difference between
the two is the “inflation” in the stock price or, in other words, how
much the price of the stock had been distorted by the alleged
fraud.11 Assuming inflation is positive, purchasers of the stock

7
Adam T. Savett, Levi & Korsinksy LLP, Securities Class Action Trials in the PostPSLRA Era (June 2022) (unpublished presentation), available at https://perma.cc/889P72AR.
8
541 F.2d 1335, 1341–46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
9
Id. at 1342–46.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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paid too much for the stock by virtue of the “inflation” in the stock
at the time of purchase.12 These same purchasers suffered economic losses when the “inflation” was removed from the stock
price, such as when a disclosure revealed to the market the alleged fraud (“corrective disclosure”).13 After the corrective disclosure, the actual price and the “value line” by definition converge
as there is no longer any distortion in the price once the market
knows the truth.14 While Judge Sneed’s framework was enormously useful, it did leave unanswered the all-important question
of how to measure the “value line”. The “value line” after all is a
hypothetical price rather than an actual price.
A. Value Line Version 1.0
One approach that was occasionally used to estimate the
“value line” during this time period was to simply take the price
immediately after the corrective disclosure, which reveals to the
market the information that should and could have been disclosed
earlier. Suppose the stock price is $200 at the time of purchase,
the price immediately prior to the corrective disclosure is $100
and immediately after the corrective disclosure is $85. Using this
approach, plaintiffs would simply take the $85 as the “true value”
of the stock as it was the market value immediately after the market was appraised of the truth, a benefit the market did not have
in setting the market price prior to the corrective disclosure. If
the stock price was $200 at time of purchase, the “inflation” would
therefore be $115 ($200 - $85) and, hence, securities damages per
share would then simply be $115 per share, assuming the investor held the shares when it dropped to $85.
This simple approach to constructing the value line could
hardly be called an economic analysis. Rather, there are a number
of glaring flaws in such an approach. Turning back to the earlier
example, the stock price fell from $100 to $85 when the corrective
disclosure occurred but inflation is still estimated at $115, a number far in excess of the $15 stock drop. But logically the drop from
$200 to $100 is presumably caused by nonfraud-related reasons
for the simple reason that, during this time, the market had not
yet learned of the alleged securities fraud. Such nonfraud-related
reasons would include market and industry movements or firmspecific nonfraud related information. Indeed, the fall from $100

12
13
14

Id.
Id.
Id.
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to $85 could likewise be the result, in whole or in part, of such
nonfraud-related reasons (as well as being a result of normal random volatility in the stock). In short, such a simple procedure ignores all the nonfraud-related reasons stock prices move both
prior to the corrective disclosure and contemporaneous with the
corrective disclosure. As Easterbrook & Fischel forcefully argued,
these are risks that the investor willingly takes on when making
the investment in the first place.15
To be fair, the argument for using $115 per share (assuming
a purchase price of $200) was sometimes justified as an economic
matter by reasoning that absent the fraud the purchaser might
never have purchased the share in the first place and hence would
have thereby avoided the full economic losses on the purchase,
i.e., $115. In securities parlance, the notion that an investor
would not have purchased the shares but for the fraud is often
referred to as “transaction causation.” But once again, obvious
problems present themselves with such an economic justification.
If the purchaser would have invested the money in a different asset what is the basis for assuming that the purchaser would not
have suffered any losses in that but for investment? And, perhaps
more to the point, transaction causation as the economic basis for
estimating securities damages does not lend itself to damages estimates in class actions.16 Is it really true that, on a class-wide
basis, but for the alleged securities fraud, all the members of the
proposed class would have uniformly decided not to purchase the
stock as opposed, for instance, to purchasing the stock at the
value line, i.e., the price they would have obtained at the time of
purchase but for the fraud? What would be the basis for such an
assertion?
As one moves into the 1980s, Value Line Version 1.0 with all
its flaws was supplanted by Value Line Version 2.0.
B. Value Line Version 2.0
Responding to the failure of Value Line Version 1.0 to adjust
the value line for market and industry movements, plaintiff experts adopted the so-called “comparable index” approach.17 The
comparable index approach represented a significant increase in
economic sophistication, including the use of regression analysis
15

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 683 (5th Cir. 2015).
17 See Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 897 (1990) (labelling this
the comparable index approach).
16
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as we will see. And, indeed, the comparable index approach was
commonly used by plaintiff experts in the 1980s and even into the
1990s (and on occasion even beyond).
Under this approach, plaintiffs’ experts utilized a regression
analysis to quantify the historical relationship between the stock
price movements and movements in the market (often proxied by
the S&P 500).18 Suppose the regression analysis documents that
a one percent movement in the market is associated with a two
percent movement in the stock price (a beta of 2). On a day on
which the market moves by one percent, the predicted return on
that day would therefore be 2% (2 × 1%). Or if the beta is found to
be 0.5, this implies that if the market falls on a particular day the
predicted return for that day is -0.5% (0.5 × -1%).
With predicted returns so calculated, plaintiffs then assumed
that the value line price moved on all days based solely on the
stock’s predicted returns, i.e., market movements. Consider the
following example in which the class period begins Monday and
the corrective disclosure occurs late Thursday with an ending
price on Friday of $85:
Day
Stock Price Predicted return Value Line Inflation
Monday
$200
-5%
$110.16
$89.84
Tuesday
$180
-10%
$104.65
$75.35
Wednesday
$120
-5%
$94.18
$25.82
Thursday
$100
-5%
$89.47
$10.53
Friday
$85
$85
0
The value line price for Thursday is $89.47, as 0.95 (representing a 5% predicted decline on Thursday) times $89.47 generates $85 on Friday. The rest of the value line prices are generated
in similar fashion. Inflation is simply the difference between the
actual price and the value line.
A glaring flaw with the comparable index approach is that
any deviation between the predicted return and the actual return
is automatically assumed to represent the impact of the fraud and
the revelation thereof. For instance, in the above example, inflation falling from $89.84 to $10.53 implies that an investor who
purchased on Monday and sold on Thursday (prior to the corrective disclosure) suffered damages of $79.31 (inflation at time of
purchase minus inflation at time of sale). But presumably the
stock-price fall from $200 to $100 was entirely due to nonfraud

18 Later it became standard to include not only general market movements but also
industry movements.
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factors, including firm-specific nonfraud factors, because the corrective disclosure had not yet occurred.
This is not a minor oversight in the model. There is a great
deal of firm-specific price movements that are not explainable by
reference to market and industry movements.19 Indeed, many securities class action cases involve companies that have declining
stock prices because the company is performing poorly long before
any corrective disclosure occurs. As for the corrective disclosure
price movement itself, the price could likewise reflect nonfraud
firm-specific information that is released alongside the corrective
information (so-called “confounding information”). In the above
example, the fall from $100 to $85 might have been caused, at
least in part, by confounding information.
C. Comparable Company Approach to Value Line
Another approach that was often used as a basis for estimating securities damages by plaintiffs during this time period (and
on occasion even later in time) was the use of company multiples
such as a price-to-earnings ratio or EBITDA-to-enterprise-value
ratio.20 Suppose a company falsely disclosed its earnings were $3
billion when in reality it was just $1 billion. Further suppose that
“comparable companies”, i.e., companies in the “same” industry,
trade at a price-to-earnings ratio on average (or with a median) of
15. Simply applying this P/E ratio to the misstated earnings ($2
billion) would imply that the company’s total market equity capitalization was “inflated” by $30 billion ($2 billion × 15). A pershare estimate of inflation would be obtained simply by dividing
this amount by the total number of shares.
Even on its own terms, the comparable company approach to
the value line would be limited to cases involving misstatements
of a particular financial metric that then could be valued by reference to a comparable multiple. It is interesting to note that this
approach does not use the stock price of the firm in question in
analyzing the price impact of the misstated information (although
the prices of other firms are being used) even though it supposedly is estimating the economic losses in that stock due to the alleged securities fraud.
Delaware jurisprudence has had long experience with valuing firms including comparable companies, albeit in the context

19

Richard Roll, R-squared, 43 J. FIN. 541, 557–66 (1988).
SHANNON PRATT & ALINA V. NICULITA, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND
APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 251 (5th ed. 2008).
20
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of corporate litigation rather than securities litigation. While to
be sure the Delaware Court of Chancery will consider comparable
multiples in valuation, the gold standard for valuation lies elsewhere: discounted cash flow analysis. A comparable company approach to valuation standing alone faces a tough road in Delaware
courts.
The stance of the Delaware Court of Chancery is understandable given the challenges with using multiples as a basis for valuation. For instance, how does one define the set of comparable
companies? As the name implies a key input to a comparable company analysis is a set of companies that are comparable to the
firm being valued. As a valuation textbook explains, “microeconomic factors that drive the [comparable] companies should be
sufficiently similar to the microeconomic factors that drive the
subject company.”21 To put it mildly, this can be a nontrivial and
contested inquiry. Potential factors that have been cited by the
Delaware Court of Chancery in defining industry include the
firm’s growth prospects, maturity of business, size and product
markets. Even when a set of comparable companies have been
identified, their trading multiples can vary significantly. Does the
company being valued more closely resemble the median of the
comparable companies or some subset of the distribution?
Turning to the use of a comparable company multiple in estimating the securities damages, such as was done in the misstated
earnings example above, there are yet further challenges on top
of the ones identified by Delaware Chancery. After all, securities
damages are concerned with generating a value line over time,
rather than a valuation at just one moment in time as is typically
the concern in Delaware Chancery. Does one constantly change
the multiple being used over the class period? How often does the
multiple change? How does one adjust the value line to include
not only the value of the misstated information, such as the misstated $2 billion in earnings in the example above, but also
changes in market and industry factors (to the extent that these
are not fully reflected in the multiple being used) or nonfraud
firm-specific information that is potentially impacting over the
class period the value of the firm, its stock price and the appropriate multiple for the company.
Event Study methodology approach to the value line: During
the 1980s, Easterbrook and Fischel pointed the way to a different

21

Id. at 262.
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and better approach: the use of the event study.22 An event study
is a widely used and generally accepted statistical framework for
testing whether there was, in fact, a stock price movement associated with the disclosure of new value-relevant public information, such as a corrective disclosure, versus the stock price
movement being a function of market and industry factors or random volatility. The general idea is that if there is a stock price
movement (that is statistically significant) and it can reliably be
ascribed to the corrective disclosure than this can be a basis for
estimating the value line. More specifically, the stock price movement so measured reflects the “inflation” in the stock price that
is now removed by virtue of the corrective disclosure.
The event study framework controls for market and industry
effects (estimated with the use of a regression such as the one
discussed in the context of the comparable index approach) on the
stock price, thereby isolating the portion of the stock price movement that is firm-specific (the “abnormal return”). In the earlier
example the abnormal return would be $10 as the stock price fell
from $100 to $85 with $5 of the decline (5% of $100) being explainable by market movements.
Moreover, the event study determines whether the observed
abnormal return on a particular date, such as the date of the corrective disclosure, is outside the range of typical random stock
price fluctuations observed for that stock. If the stock price movement is indistinguishable from random price fluctuations (i.e.,
falls with the confidence interval), the movement is fully explainable by movements in the market and industry and cannot be attributed to the new firm-specific information announced on the
event date, such as a corrective disclosure date.23 An abnormal
return is typically considered “statistically significant” in an
event study if it lies outside the 95% confidence interval (i.e., lies
outside the range that accounts for 95% of random price fluctuations).
It is important to note that if there is a statistically significant price movement on the date of the corrective disclosure (or
corrective disclosures) according to the event study that does not
necessarily mean that this is the firm-specific price reaction to
that information. As one textbook explains:

22 Fischel, supra note 6, at 17; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 326–29; see
also Cornell & Morgan, supra note 18, at 903–23.
23 See, e.g., Charles J. Corrado, Event Studies: A Methodology Review, 51 ACCT. &
FIN. 207, 209–11 (2011).

106

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:97

An event study can tell us that something happened, but it
can’t tell us why. To explain positive or negative abnormal
returns, we must closely examine the events and institutions
involved . . . . The event study technique does not eliminate
the need to assess cause through deductive reasoning; it
only . . . helps delineate what needs to be explained.24
One particularly important issue in this vein is confounding
information: the possibility that contemporaneous with the disclosure of corrective information there is nonfraud related information also being released. In other words, if there is a statistically significant abnormal return on the corrective disclosure
date, there is still the further question of what information can
account for the price movement. This last inquiry of exploring
what might explain statistically significant abnormal returns
plays an important part in the evolution of securities damages
estimates as we move forward in time, as we will see.
Generally speaking, plaintiff experts in the 1980s infrequently used the event study methodology. By and large, event
study methodology was used, if at all, in the course of assessing
plaintiff experts’ value line generated using one of the other approaches to the value line. However, all this was to change in the
1990s.
III. THE RISE OF THE EVENT STUDY: 1993–2005
The year 1993 marks an important demarcation point in the
history of securities damages. This was the year that the Supreme
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.25 The
Daubert Court emphasized the gatekeeper role of courts to ensure
that expert analysis comports with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 703 which requires an expert to rely on facts and data “of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions upon the subject.”26
In the aftermath of the Daubert opinion, event study methodology became essentially required in many courts. For instance,
the court in In re Imperial Credit Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation27 excluded under Daubert a plaintiffs’ expert damages report because the report did “not contain an event study or similar

24 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 221 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis in original).
25 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
26 Id. at 595.
27 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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analysis.” In so doing, the court noted that a “number of courts
have rejected or refused to admit into evidence damages reports
or testimony by damages experts in securities cases which fail to
include event studies or something similar.”28
Indeed, the same year Daubert was decided, a lower court in
the In re Oracle Securities Litigation29 case strongly criticized the
plaintiffs’ expert’s use of a price-to-earnings comparable company
approach to the value line.30 The court noted that this approach
failed to adjust for nonfraud related reasons that might move
stock price, including nonfraud firm-specific information and random volatility in the stock price. The court also noted that the
failure to employ an event study meant that the “results reached
by [plaintiffs’ expert] cannot be evaluated by standard measures
of statistical significance.”31 While the Oracle Securities Litigation
decision did not involve a Daubert challenge to an expert, these
observations would prove important in why courts began to require the use of an event study on pain of having the expert’s testimony excluded.
As a result of these developments, in the 1990s the comparable company approach to the value line dramatically declined in
importance and frequency, as did the comparable index approach
(Value Line Approach 2.0), both being supplanted by the event
study methodology. In fact, shortly after the Daubert decision, it
was standard practice at plaintiff law firms, such as Milberg
Weiss (the dominant securities plaintiff law firm at the time), to
run an event study at the very beginning of the litigation in order
to understand potential securities damages.32
The rise of the event study methodology in the 1990s represents a significant advance on the prior approaches in terms of
financial sophistication of assessing securities damages. An evolution in sophistication that continued as we will see into modern
times. While event studies reigned supreme in the 1990s, there
was still the important question of what to do with a statistically
significant abnormal return associated with a corrective disclosure date in terms of generating the value line.
Two immediate issues presented themselves. The first is the
issue of confounding information referenced earlier. What if
alongside a corrective disclosure (such as an announcement that
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
The defendants’ expert in this matter was Professor Fischel. Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1181.
Based on my conversations with securities lawyers at the time.
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the firm misstated profits) there was negative nonfraud-related
information also being released at the same time? What portion,
if any, of a statistically significant abnormal return can be ascribed to the corrective disclosure given the potential price impact
of the other negative information? An event study by itself cannot
explain why there is abnormal return. Curiously, this issue was
by and large glossed over or ignored during this time period in
plaintiffs’ expert analyses proffering damages estimates. Rather,
like event studies in the 1980s, this issue mostly arose in the context of defendants’ experts arguing that plaintiffs’ expert damages analyses using the event study approach were overstated as
some, or all, of the abnormal return did not represent damages
arising from the alleged securities fraud but rather the price impact of contemporaneous nonfraud-related disclosures. These arguments were very rarely adjudicated, however, as the vast majority of cases that survived a motion to dismiss and summary
judgment simply settled. The issue of confounding information,
and the need to affirmatively address it when proffering a securities damage estimate, became far more prominent in the years
after 2005, the year when the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo33 on securities damages
and causation, which I will turn to shortly.
The second issue involves the mechanics of calculating the
value line. Consider again the simple example of a stock which
has a price of $200 at the beginning of the class period and then
over time falls to $100. At this point there is an announcement of
a corrective disclosure (with no confounding information) with the
stock dropping from $100 to $85. Suppose the event study indicates that the abnormal price component of the $15 price movement is $10 and that the $10 is statistically significant, i.e., not
explainable by normal random volatility in the stock. Under the
event study approach, what is the “inflation” at the beginning of
the class period?
Plaintiffs’ experts at this time would often use the “constant
percentage” approach in answering this question. Mechanically,
this meant that one takes the abnormal stock return ($10/$100 =
10%) and multiply that return percentage by the stock price to
calculate inflation at any point in time. In this example, inflation
would therefore be $20 when the stock price was $200 with that
inflation falling to $10 (when the stock price was $100)

33

544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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immediately prior to the corrective disclosure and finally zero
once the stock price is $85 and the market has learned the truth.
In a situation where the stock price is falling prior to the corrective disclosure, which was and is quite common in securities
cases, this approach would increase “inflation” earlier in the class
period and hence securities damages relative to simply taking the
dollar amount of the abnormal stock price movement ($10) and
applying it to the beginning of the class period and every point
thereafter (the latter approach being called “constant dollar”). Using constant percentage, someone who purchased at $200 and
sold prior to the corrective disclosure at $100 suffered economic
losses of $10 ($20 inflation at time of purchase minus $10 of inflation at time of sale) ascribable to the fraud according to the
“constant percentage” approach. In other words, constant percentage can have the effect of causing inflation to fall as the stock
price falls even prior to any corrective disclosure despite the fact
that the stock price was falling presumably for nonfraud-related
reasons during this period—whether that be market, industry or
firm-specific information—given that the market had not learned
of the corrective disclosure.
The need to identify when purchases occurred during the
class period and how long those shares were held given that inflation varied over the class period led to the use of so-called trading models in the 1990s by plaintiffs’ experts. Essentially these
models made assumptions about the types of traders in the marketplace and how long they held their shares for—assumptions
that were largely if not entirely ungrounded in empirical data.34
These models ran into significant problems under Daubert. The
most important of these decisions was the Kaufman v. Motorola35
opinion in 2000 in which the court excluded under Daubert a
plaintiff expert’s trading model. In the years after Kaufman v.
Motorola the use of trading models declined significantly and became quite infrequent after 2005.36

34 DANIEL R. FISCHEL ET AL., NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB. INT., THE USE OF
TRADING MODELS TO ESTIMATE AGGREGATE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION:
AN UPDATE (2006).
35 Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95 C 1069, 2000 WL 1506892, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2000).
36 In 2005 there was another judicial decision critical of trading models. See In re
Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. SACV01275GLTMLGX, 2005 WL 1403756, at *2–3 (C.D.
Cal. June 3, 2005).
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IV. THE MODERN ERA: 2005–PRESENT
Another Supreme Court decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals,
marks the beginning of my last period. In discussing securities
damages in “fraud on the market” Rule 10b–5 cases, the Court
made several important observations. First, the Court explained
that securities damages exist not to “provide investors with broad
insurance against market losses, but to protect them against
those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”37
The Court noted that economic losses by an investor can be
caused not by the alleged misrepresentation but rather by
“changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations,
new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other
events.”38 The Court went on to critically note that the securities
complaint at issue in that case failed to “claim that [the company’s] share price fell significantly after the truth became
known.”39 The Court’s focus on when “the truth became known”40
and whether or not that caused a share price reaction helped set
the stage for the modern era of securities damages. I will now turn
to two developments in the years after the Dura decision reflecting the Court’s emphasis on excluding non-fraud related economic
losses from securities damages estimates.
First, the use of the constant percentage approach by plaintiffs’ experts offering a securities damages estimate dropped off
dramatically in favor of the constant dollar approach after the
Dura decision. It follows from the constant dollar approach that
so-called “in and out” traders, investors that purchased during
the class period but sold before the first purported corrective disclosure, are ineligible to be members of the class. Indeed, this is
reflected in the holding of Dura itself: an investor who purchases
at an inflated price and then sells at the same inflated price has
not suffered any damages caused by the alleged securities fraud.
Second, the issue of confounding information became far
more of a focal point. In a manner and degree that was not generally true in the 1990s, securities damage estimates needed to
adequately distinguish and adjust for confounding information
versus corrective information. For this reason, in part, analyst reports and market commentaries during the class period took on
renewed importance as resources to understand what was
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Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 345.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 347.
Id.
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important to the market and why. The issue of confounding information was reflective of a broader level of technical sophistication
in the securities damages analysis, a process that Easterbrook
and Fischel were instrumental in starting.41
I will provide three examples of this increased technical sophistication in the context of event study analysis as illustrative
of this trend. The traditional event study used in securities damages often used one-day event windows to estimate the abnormal
return associated with a corrective disclosure. But suppose during that same trading day, albeit at a different point in time, there
was nonfraud negative information released. While the abnormal
return estimated using the one-day event window will capture the
impact of both disclosures, an intraday event study can potentially isolate the impact of the corrective information.
Another important issue is that of “heteroscedasticity.” Heteroscedasticity is a potential serious problem as its presence violates the assumption of the regression underlying event studies.42
An example of heteroscedasticity would be a situation in which
the abnormal returns calculated by the event study increase in
volatility over time. A standard way to correct a regression model
which suffers from heteroscedasticity is to perform generalized
least squares (GLS) regression when running an event study,
which gives more weight to observations from periods believed to
be more stable and less weight to observations from periods believed to be more volatile.43
My third example is based on Patton and Vernando, who examined whether the daily beta of a stock (typically estimated in
an event study based on months of trading data prior to the event
for which an abnormal return is being measured) increases with
the release of the firm’s quarterly earnings announcement.44 They
find that in fact the daily beta can increase on this information
event (and revert back to the old beta several days later).45 This
potential increase in the beta, an effect that would not be

41

See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2; Fischel, supra note 6.
See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 268–69 (5th ed. 2009). Wooldridge summarizes the problems caused by heteroscedasticity: “whenever the variance of the unobserved factors changes across different
segments of the population . . . the OLS standard errors . . . are no longer valid for constructing confidence intervals and t statistics.” Id. The t-statistic is necessary to determine
the statistical significance of individual dates, such as corrective disclosure dates.
43 See, e.g., id. at 280–88.
44 Andrew J. Patton & Michela Verardo, Does Beta Move with News? Firm-Specific
Information Flows and Learning About Profitability, 25 R. FIN. STUD. 2789 (2012).
45 Id. at 2789.
42
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captured by traditional event study analysis, has been used in the
context of securities damages event study analysis in measuring
abnormal returns and whether they are statistically significant.46

46 See, e.g., Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., No. CV12–0555, 2019 WL 7282026, at *11
(D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2019).

